School Entry, Educational Attainment and Quarter of Birth: A Cautionary Tale of Late by Barua, Rashmi & Lang, Kevin
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
7-2009
School Entry, Educational Attainment and Quarter
of Birth: A Cautionary Tale of Late
Rashmi Barua
Singapore Management University
Kevin Lang
Boston University
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Economics Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
Barua, Rashmi and Lang, Kevin. School Entry, Educational Attainment and Quarter of Birth: A Cautionary Tale of Late. (2009).
Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1149
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
SCHOOL ENTRY, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND QUARTER OF BIRTH:
A CAUTIONARY TALE OF LATE
Rashmi Barua
Kevin Lang
Working Paper 15236
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15236
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
August 2009
We are grateful to Josh Angrist, Sandy Black, Jim Heckman, Caroline Hoxby, Claudia Olivetti, Daniele
Paserman and participants in seminars at Boston University, University of Chicago, MIT, UC Irvine,
NYU, Pomona College, Tilburg University, the Tinbergen Institute, SOLE and Econometric Society
for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual caveat applies. Barua acknowledges funding under
NSF-AERA grant REC-0634035. Lang acknowledges funding from NICHD under grant number R03
HD056056-01 and NSF under grant number SEC-0339149. The opinions expressed here are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of the funding agencies or of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
© 2009 by Rashmi Barua and Kevin Lang. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.
School Entry, Educational Attainment and Quarter of Birth: A Cautionary Tale of LATE
Rashmi Barua and Kevin Lang
NBER Working Paper No. 15236
August 2009
JEL No. C21,I20,J24
ABSTRACT
Partly in response to increased testing and accountability, states and districts have been raising the
minimum school entry age, but existing studies show mixed results regarding the effects of entry age.
These studies may be severely biased because they violate the monotonicity assumption needed for
LATE. We propose an instrument not subject to this bias and show no effect on the educational attainment
of children born in the fourth quarter of moving from a December 31 to an earlier cutoff. We then
estimate a structural model of optimal entry age that reconciles the different IV estimates including
ours. We find that one standard instrument is badly biased but that the other diverges from ours because
it estimates a different LATE. We also find that an early entry age cutoff that is applied loosely (as
in the 1950s) is beneficial but one that is strictly enforced is not.
Rashmi Barua
School of Economics
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903 
rashmibarua@smu.edu.sg
Kevin Lang
Department of Economics
Boston University
270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA  02215
and NBER
lang@bu.edu
1 Introduction
Over the last four decades many states and school districts have increased the minimum
age at which children may enter kindergarten. In the 1960s children frequently entered
kindergarten when they were considerably less than ve years old (or rst grade when they
were less than six years old). This was formally permitted in many states. In others, it
was relatively easy to get around the rules. Today, thirty-eight states have cut-o¤ dates
requiring children entering kindergarten to be ve years old before October 16 of the year in
which they enter kindergarten, and some of the remaining states have districts that apply a
stricter standard and the process continues. In recent years, Rhode Island, Maryland, Ohio
and Hawaii revised their statutes to raise the kindergarten entry age. Kindergarten teachers
press for stricter standards, and schools and districts, under increasing pressure to adhere
to strict standards, are receptive to their arguments. Although the No Child Left Behind
Act (NCLB) does not directly address the issue of entry age, one strategy for improving
performance on exams is to delay the age at which children take them. Children who enter
school when they are older generally do better on exams in the early elementary years.
Thus, delaying the start of schooling can help states and districts meet the requirements of
NCLB. However, this trend might be harmful rather than benecial. Some critics of NCLB
would argue that delayed school entry is one of its adverse unintended consequences. They
argue that delayed entry reduces educational attainment and contributes to the dropout
rate, particularly among children from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds.1
Whether delayed entry improves or worsens education outcomes is controversial. Fol-
lowing Angrist and Kruegers (1991, 1992) seminal papers, much research in both education
and economics has been devoted to obtaining consistent estimates of the e¤ects of school
entry age. Angrist and Krueger address the potential endogeneity of entry age by using
quarter of birth as an instrument for entry age. They show that historically individuals born
in the rst quarter started school later than those born in the fourth quarter, completed
less education and earned less than those born in the rest of the year.2
Critics of this approach argue that quarter of birth may be directly related to student
outcomes or parental socioeconomic status.3 In a recent paper, Buckles and Hungerman
(2008) provide evidence that children born at di¤erent times in the year are conceived
by women with di¤erent socioeconomic characteristics. To address this problem, several
researchers have exploited the variation in state laws governing entry age to identify its
1Deming and Dynarski (2008) discusses the "grayingof kindergarten and reviews elements of this debate.
2See also Mayer and Knutson, 1999 and Cahan and Cohen,1989.
3Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995; Bound and Jaeger, 2000.
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e¤ect on test scores, wages, educational attainment and other outcomes.4 However, since
entry age depends on both state law and date of birth, the potential endogeneity of date of
birth remains problematic for this approach.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we address certain under-appreciated issues in
the instrumental variable literature. Imbens and Angrist (1994), Angrist and Imbens (1995)
and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) show that with heterogeneous treatment e¤ects,
under certain conditions, IV identies the Local Average Treatment E¤ect (LATE). One
condition, termed monotonicity,generally treated as an unimportant regularity condition,
requires that while the instrument may have no e¤ect on some individuals, all of those who
are a¤ected should be a¤ected unidirectionally. We argue that both standard instruments,
quarter of birth and legal entry age, provide inconsistent estimates of LATE because they
violate monotonicity. Therefore, we propose an instrument that satises monotonicity and
gives consistent estimates of the LATE of school entry age on educational attainment.
Second, we are interested in the broader question of the optimal age at which to start
school and, in particular, optimal policy regarding school entry age. It is not clear that
either of the two standard instruments, even if consistent, would estimate a LATE that is
of policy interest. If the law were uniform and strictly enforced and therefore monotonicity
satised, the born in rst quarter instrument could only hope to identify the e¤ect of
entering school when roughly six months older (on average) than those born in the other
three quarters.5 A practical policy might allow children born in the rst quarter to enter a
year earlier than policy previously permitted. Unless we believe that the e¤ect of entry age
is linear, the e¤ect of an average six-month di¤erence in entry may be very uninformative
about the e¤ect of entering a full year earlier. Assessing the LATE measured when we use
legal entry age as an instrument is more complex but similar. Our instrument measures
the e¤ect on children who would otherwise enter kindergarten in the year they turn ve of
delaying entry until the year in which they turn six.
Third, we use simulated data to study the e¤ect of having strict academic standards, as is
practiced in schools today, on average educational attainment. Legislations, such as the No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) act of 2001, have put great pressure on schools to adhere to strict
academic standards. To achieve the objectives of the legislation within the specied time
frame, schools are introducing academic reforms as early as preschool. Increasing academic
curriculum in kindergarten is often cited as one of the reasons for rising school entry age
(Deming and Dynarski, 2008; Stipek, 2006). In the past, concerns have been raised about
4Allen and Barnsley, 1993; Bedard and Dhuey, 2006, 2008; Cascio and Lewis, 2006; Datar, 2005; Dobkin
and Ferreira, 2007; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; Fertig and Kluve, 2005; Fredriksson and Ockert, 2006;
McCrary and Royer, 2006; Puhani and Weber, 2007.
5Literally, the weighted average of the e¤ect of di¤erent entry age discrepancies with a mean discrepancy
of about six months.
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the e¤ect of increasing academic standards, however, to our knowledge, no study has directly
tested this. Given the historical nature of our data, the instrumental variables approach
captures the e¤ect of delaying school entry as it was practiced in the 1950s. But school
entry age laws are now enforced much more strictly. Consequentially, we construct a model
of optimal school entry age that is well-suited to conducting several policy experiments
including examining the e¤ect of stricter enforcement. The policy experiment suggests that,
in an environment where laws are strictly enforced, constraining fourth quarter children to
enter late hurts these children and reduces average educational attainment.
Our two-sample two-stage least squares (TS2SLS) results show that using the quarter
of birth instrument yields severely biased estimates of the e¤ect of requiring students to
enter school later than they would otherwise have chosen. When we use the consistent
estimator that meets the monotonicity requirement and measures this LATE, the e¤ect of
school entry age on educational attainment is very close to zero.
However, comparing the di¤erent IV estimates does not tell us whether they diverge
because the traditional estimators are inconsistent or because they are measuring di¤erent
LATEs. Therefore, we develop a model of optimal school entry ages. We estimate the
parameters of the model using indirect inference.
Our results show that in states with a late cuto¤, the earliest optimal entry age ranges
from age 4 to 4.5 years depending on the model.6 In states with a fourth quarter cuto¤ the
optimal entry age distribution is shifted by less than 0.01 years, and we cannot reject the
hypothesis that optimal entry age is una¤ected by the cuto¤ date.
Further, we use our simulated data to obtain trueand IV estimates of the local average
treatment e¤ect of school entry age on educational attainment. We nd that the IV estimate
based on the legal entry age instrument is a badly biased estimator of the LATE it is
intended to estimate. In contrast, in our simulations, using born in rst quarter as an
instrument generates estimates that diverge only modestly from the LATE the estimator
seeks to determine.
The next section explores the literature on school entry age. Section III outlines the
TS2SLS methods that we use for our baseline model. Section IV describes the data. We
present the TS2SLS results in section V. Section VI builds and estimates a model of optimal
school entry age. We use this model to evaluate two standard IV estimators found in the
literature. In addition, we conduct policy experiments to understand the e¤ect of di¤erent
policy regimes on educational attainment. Section VII concludes.
6We impose that the latest optimal entry age is seven.
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2 School Entry Age: Background
2.1 Literature
There has been a recent explosion of interest in school entry age that makes it di¢ cult
to treat the literature with justice. Until the 1990s, studies that looked at the e¤ect of
school entry age on student outcomes largely ignored the potential endogeneity of entry age.
However, a­ uent parents can a¤ord child care costs associated with delaying their childs
school entry and are therefore more likely to do so. Thus, there is a positive association
between parental socioeconomic conditions and entry age that can bias the OLS estimate
towards a positive e¤ect of entry age on academic outcomes. On the other hand, the
OLS estimate could be downward biased if children who are less precocious intellectually
and/or emotionally are redshirted7 since these children are more likely to perform poorly
on cognitive tests
Angrist and Krueger (1991, 1992), Cahan and Cohen (1989) and Mayer and Knutson
(1999) address endogeneity by using quarter or month of birth as an instrument for entry
age. More recent papers (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Datar, 2005; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009;
McCrary and Royer, 2006) have used legal entry age as an instrument. This approach
instruments actual entry age with the age at which the child could rst legally enter school.
It thus relies on both variation in state (or country) laws and month of birth.
Although somewhat mixed, the evidence from this literature suggests that older entrants
have higher test scores compared to early entrants in the same grade and are less likely to
repeat grades. However, the test score di¤erences fade by the time the child is in middle
school. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) nd a small benecial e¤ect of early entry on
cognitive score at age 18. Comparing younger children of the same age, Barua and Lang
(2008) nd that early entrants perform better on achievement tests, presumably because
they have completed more schooling relative to those who began school late.
Therefore it is important to determine whether entry age a¤ects ultimate educational
attainment. If late entry reduces grade retention, has no negative e¤ect on performance
within grade and has no adverse e¤ect on ultimate grade completion, then later entry
produces the same outcome at lower cost to the public (although parents pay more for
child-care and their children enter the labor market later). However, if later entry is not
o¤set by later exit, those who enter late leave school with less education (Angrist & Krueger,
1991) and fewer skills than earlier entrants leaving at that age. In this case, delaying entry
reduces human capital accumulation.
The literature on the e¤ect of entry age on educational attainment provides mixed
7 In this context, redshirting refers to the practice of postponing entrance into kindergarten of age-eligible
children in order to allow extra time for socioemotional, intellectual, or physical growth.
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results. For the U.S., Angrist and Krueger (1992) and Dobkin and Ferreira (2007) nd that
older entrants attain slightly less education and Deming and Dynarski (2008) attribute
much of the decline in educational attainment to the trend towards later school entry, but
Bedard and Dhuey (2008) nd no e¤ect. Outside the US, some studies nd a negative
impact of early school entry on adult educational attainment and other outcomes (Allen
and Barnsley, 1993; Fredriksson and Ockert, 2006) while others nd positive or no e¤ects
(Fertig and Kluve, 2005; Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2008).8 In this paper, we argue
that these ndings are suspect because of important issues with the identication strategies
used in the existing literature.
2.2 Specication Issues
Historically, economists assumed that instrumental variables estimates captured a single
coe¢ cient, the common e¤ect of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable. Lang
(1993) criticized the use of quarter of birth as an instrument for education in Angrist
and Krueger (1991). He argued that the relation between log wage and education was
inherently nonlinear and that the standard log wage equation should be viewed as a linear
approximation in which the coe¢ cient on schooling is random. He further argued that the
Angrist/Krueger estimate of the return to schooling could be a severely biased estimate of
the average of this random coe¢ cient (now termed the Average Treatment E¤ect) because
the justication for their instrument implies that it estimates the return to education only
for those with relatively little education.
Building on Yitzhakis (1989) insight that an OLS slope can be interpreted as a weighted
average of adjacent slopes, Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that in a random coe¢ cients
model (i.e. one with heterogeneous treatment e¤ects), under certain conditions, instrumen-
tal variables can still be interpreted as a Local Average Treatment E¤ect. LATE is the
average e¤ect of a treatment on those individuals whose treatment status is changed by the
instrument. With a binary treatment, these are the complierswho receive the treatment
when the instrument applies but not otherwise. With a multi-valued treatment, these are
the individuals who increase the intensity of their treatment, and the estimated LATE gives
more weight to individuals with larger responses to the instrument (Angrist and Imbens,
1995).
One of the assumptions for the identication of LATE is monotonicity: while the in-
strument may have no e¤ect on some individuals, all of those who are a¤ected must be
a¤ected in the same direction. Both the quarter of birth instrument and the legal entry age
8Consistent with nding no e¤ect on educational attainment, Black, Devereux and Salvanes nd a pos-
itive e¤ect of early entry on earnings for younger workers, presumably because they have more experience.
However Bedard and Dhuey nd an adverse e¤ect on earnings in the United States.
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instrument violate the monotonicity assumption.9 Many parents do not enroll their chil-
dren at the earliest permissible entry age (and some nd ways to enroll them earlier than
is formally allowed). Such strategic behavior is more common among parents of children
born in the latter half of the year (West, Meek and Hurst, 2000). Thus almost all students
born in May enter kindergarten in September following their fth birthday (or rst grade
following their sixth birthday). In contrast, some children born in October will enter before
their fth birthday, when they are younger than those born in May, while others will enter
the following year when they are older than entrants born in May. Therefore quarter of
birth is not monotonically related to school entry age.
Table 1 provides evidence of redshirting in the U.S. in the early 1950s. Using reported
age and grade at the time of the 1960 Census, it shows the distribution of entry age by
quarter of birth for the 1952 and 1953 cohorts. For example, among those born in 1952,
12.83% of children born in the rst quarter entered kindergarten in the year that they turned
four, that is when they are approximately 4.5 years old. It is evident that the proportion
of children who enter kindergarten on or later than the year they turn six is highest among
the fourth-quarter births. Almost 46% of 1952 born children and 40% of the 1953 cohort
entered kindergarten later than age 5. So relative to other children, those born in the
fourth quarter have a higher probability of entering school when they are old. However the
youngest children entering school, those who are only 3.75 years old, are also born in the
fourth quarter.10
                          Table 1:  Entrance Age by QOB and Cut Off Date
                      Quarter of Birth
1 2 3 4 4 4
Birth Year: 1952 UnconstrainedState
Constrained
State
4 yrs or younger 12.83 8.37 8.29 6.14 9.8 5.3
5 yrs 78.16 80.71 79.3 48.4 67.35 44.01
6 yrs and older 9.01 10.92 12.41 45.46 22.86 50.69
Birth Year: 1953
4 yrs or younger 13.41 8.2 8.91 6.57 10.04 5.48
5 yrs 83.79 85.7 85.7 53.88 81.21 45.27
6 yrs and older 0 2.93 2.56 18.26 2.16 23.33
Not yet entered 2.8 3.17 2.83 21.29 6.59 25.92
9Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) note that uniformity is a better term for the monotonicity
condition introduced by Imbens and Angrist (1994) as the condition requires that the instrument a¤ects all
individuals in the same way rather than any particular individual in a specic way.
10The ages refer to the year before rst grade for those who do not attend kindergarten. Equivalently, we
assume that students who enter school in rst grade would have spent one year in kindergarten had they
enrolled. The dating of kindergarten entry is imperfect because we do not have data on retention. The
higher rate of "late" entry in 1952 probably reects the greater time that the older children have had to be
retained in grade.
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We summarize the comparison between children born in the rst and fourth quarters in
1952 in gure 1. We can see that neither distribution of entry age is greater than the other
in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance. Being born in the rst quarter rather than
the fourth quarter raises entry age for some children and lowers it for others.
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The fth column of table 1 reports the entry age distribution for fourth quarter born
children who were born before the state cuto¤ and were therefore eligible to enter kinder-
garten even before they turn ve.11 In this group, 23% of the 1952 cohort and 9% of the
1953 cohort had delayed entry. Even taking into account that some children may have been
retained in grade, it is evident that there was considerable redshirting.
It is also evident that in the 1950s, there was considerable exibility around state cuto¤s.
About half of children born in the fourth quarter in states with cuto¤s on or before October
1 nevertheless entered school before they turned ve.
It is easy to develop examples where the IV estimate using QOB or legal entry age
gives severely biased estimates because of the failure of the monotonicity assumption. For
simplicity assume that children are born either in the rst half of the year, in which case
they enter school when they are 5.5 years old or in the second half of the year in which
case they can enter when they are either 5 or 6. Suppose that all children benet from
entering school when they are older. However, 75% get a benet of 4 (on some measure)
11Unconstrained states refer to states where fourth quarter children are not constrained by the law to delay
school entry. These would be, for instance, states with January 1st cuto¤s. On the other hand, constrained
states refer to states with an October 1st cuto¤.
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from being 6 instead of 5.5 (and lose 4 from being 5 instead of 5.5). For the parents of
these children, the benet of delay does not outweigh the cost of extra child care. All such
children enter at age 5. However, 25% of children get a benet of 12 from entering at age
6 instead of 5.5. The parents of these children all choose to delay the childs entry. The
average gain (treatment e¤ect) from delaying entry from age 5.5 to age 6 is 0.75*4+0.25*12
= 6. However, the IV estimate is the average outcome for those born in the second half
of the year minus the average outcome for those born in the rst half of the year divided
by the di¤erence in average age at entry or 0=0:25 = 0: Even though every child benets
from entering school when older, the IV estimate is that entry age has no e¤ect on the
outcome. As this simple example illustrates, failure to satisfy the monotonicity assumption
can produce an estimate with the wrong sign.
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Although neither quarter of birth nor legal entry age satises monotonicity, it is possible
to nd an instrument that does. Figure 2 reproduces the last two columns of table 1 for
1952. We can see that rst-order stochastic dominance is satised: children born in the
fourth quarter in states that prohibit them from entering kindergarten in the year that
they turn ve enter school later than do those in states that permit them to enter. We
note that rst-order stochastic dominance is only a necessary, not a su¢ cient, condition for
monotonicity.12
12As discussed in detail in Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006), an additional variable inuencing entry
age but not included in the estimation could be correlated with the state law and lead to a violation of
monotonicity. The IV estimate would provide an inconsistent estimate of LATE even though the usual
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In the next two sections we compare IV estimates of the e¤ect of school entry on educa-
tional attainment for di¤erent choices of instrument. We use the argument above to propose
an instrument that satises monotonicity and show that the quarter of birth instrument
and the legal entry age instrument give biased estimates of the policy-relevant LATE.
3 Methods: Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares
We estimate the following equation for educational attainment:
Ai = Di +X
0
i +
4X
j=2
Qijj + Ri + i (1)
where, Ai is the educational attainment of individual i. Di is the dummy endogenous
variable that takes on the value of 1 if individual i0s school entry is delayed from the year in
which he turns ve to the year in which he turns six. Qij is a set of three dummy variables
(j = 2; 3; 4) indicating the quarter of birth of the ith individual. Xi is a vector of observable
individual characteristics and Ri denotes state controls. Since OLS estimates of  in the
above model might be biased by the decision of some parents to accelerate or redshirt their
children, we estimate a 2SLS model based on the following rst stage equation:
Di = Zi +X
0
i+
4X
j=2
Qijj + 'Ri + i (2)
The binary instrument Zi equals one if the individual was required by state law to
delay kindergarten entry. In other words if the childs month of birth is later than the
state kindergarten entry age cuto¤ date, Zi equals one and equals zero otherwise. In this
setting, LATE implies that we identify the policy relevant parameter i.e. the e¤ect on those
individuals who delay enrollment only because they are constrained by the law.
In contrast, it is unclear what the policy relevance of other LATE estimates would
be even if they were consistent. For example, suppose that we use legal entry age as an
instrument in a country in which everyone enters exactly at the legally permitted. In this
case monotonicity is satised. Moreover OLS and IV are identical, which simplies the
analysis. The LATE estimator is therefore a least squares approximation of the e¤ect of
entering school when one day older. This is a reasonable measure of the e¤ect of making
everyone one day older when she enters school. It is therefore a measure of the e¤ect of
requirements for IV are satised. For example, if states permitting early entry age also tended to be states
with inexpensive childcare, some people who would delay entry and take advantage of the inexpensive
childcare in an early entry age state might succeed in entering their child early in a state with a stricter
cuto¤. If this e¤ect were modest, stochastic dominance could be satised even though monotonicity is not.
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moving the rst day of school one day later if nothing else changed. However, for the most
part, moving the rst day of school from early September to early October in order to raise
the school entry age is not part of the policy discussion. What is under discussion is whether
to change the minimum entry age. The LATE estimate using legal entry age may be a very
poor estimate of the e¤ect of moving the entry age for a group of students from just under
ve years old to just under six years old.
Some researchers (e.g. Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2008) have relied on a regres-
sion discontinuity design rather than the instrumental variables approach. At least in our
context, taken literally, RD relies on a no deercondition rather than the more general
monotonicity condition. If the cuto¤ date for school entry is September 1, then children
born on August 31 and who are red-shirted will be only one day older than those born on
September 1 who enter when they are rst legally permitted to do so. As we further shrink
the time range (those born just before and just after midnight), the di¤erence shrinks to
zero. So all we require is that any child who would be red-shirted if born just before mid-
night would comply with the law if born just after midnight. Similarly, any child who would
enter before the legal permissible age if born just after midnight would not be red-shirted if
born just before. This corresponds to the no deer assumption with a dichotomous treat-
ment and instrument. The RD design captures the e¤ect of being a year older on those
a¤ected by the law right at the discontinuity.
Of course, in practice, the discontinuity sample is drawn from a much broader range
than a few minutes or even a day. It is common in such cases to include a trend (or
separate trends on each side of the discontinuity). Provided the trend is properly specied,
this approach still captures the e¤ect right at the discontinuity. It is worth noting that the
trend will capture any e¤ect of being a day younger and the changing degree of compliance.
However, provided that compliance changes continuously (parents of children born on July
31 do not act in a very di¤erent way from those with children born on August 1), this does
not a¤ect the interpretation of the coe¢ cient on the discontinuity.
The external validity of the RD estimate is a more serious issue. Policy-makers do not
generally consider changing the entry cuto¤ by an innitesimal amount. It is much more
common to change the date by a few months. If the RD measures the e¤ect of being a year
older on children born in late December and who are not red-shirted, it may not provide a
good estimate of the LATE for children born in early October and who are not red-shirted
since red-shirting is likely to be much more common among the former than among the
latter.
This suggests that we might want to look at the fourth quarter/rst quarter discontinuity
rather than the December 31/January 1 discontinuity. However, if the RD estimate does
not control for a trend and the discontinuity sample includes observations that are fairly far
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from the discontinuity, then the monotonicity assumption may become important again.
To our knowledge, there is no large nationally representative data set with information
on school entry age, educational attainment and quarter of birth. To circumvent the lack of
data, we use the Two Sample Instrumental Variable (TSIV) procedure developed by Angrist
and Krueger (1992,1995). TSIV requires that we have data on the endogenous variable (Di)
and the instrument, Zi, for a cohort in one data set and the outcome of interest (Ai) and
Zi of the same cohort in another data set. We combine data from the 1960 and 1980
US Census for individuals born in the US between 1949 and 1953. We obtain rst stage
coe¢ cients from the 1960 Census and use them to predict entry age of the contemporaneous
1980 Census respondents. Instrumental variable estimates are generated by regressing 1980
educational outcomes on the cross-sample tted value of their entry age. 13The standard
errors are then adjusted to account for the use of a predicted value in the second stage.
The appendix gives a detailed description of the method used to consistently estimate the
correct asymptotic covariance matrix.
Since we control for quarter of birth (and state), the instrument has a monotonic e¤ect
on school entry age. The monotonicity assumption would be violated if there were deers
(Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996), in other words, if some
children born in the fourth quarter enter school early only when they are prohibited from
doing so. Although we cannot directly test for such violations, we nd them implausible.
Our identication strategy requires that the school entry cuto¤ date has no e¤ect on
the educational outcomes of children who are not constrained by the law. This assumption
would be violated if parents do not want their child to be the youngest in class. In this
case, they might not redshirt a child born in September in a state with a late cuto¤ (e.g.
January 1), but decide to redshirt in a state with an early cuto¤ (e.g., October 1).
Table 2 provides some evidence that this no externalitycondition is satised. Using
the 1960 Census, we show the average entry age by quarter of birth of individuals born
between 1949-1953 in two types of states. As this table illustrates, the average school entry
age of individuals born in the rst three quarters does not vary much by whether they are
in a fourth quarter constrained state or not. In other words, raising the minimum entry
age does not a¤ect redshirting among those not constrained by the law. In contrast, the
distribution of entry age for the fourth quarter di¤ers noticeably between the two types of
states.
Moreover, in the 1960s there is signicant noncompliance, especially among fourth quar-
ter children, in both types of states. In states with a 10/1 or 9/30 cuto¤, almost 45% of
13 Inoue and Solon (2006) call this the two-sample two-stage least squares (TS2SLS) estimator. They note
that in nite samples, the TSIV estimator originally proposed by Angrist and Krueger and the TS2SLS
estimator typically used by practitioners are numerically distinct. In addition, they show that the TS2SLS
estimator is asymptotically more e¢ cient.
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fourth quarter individuals enter school even before they are allowed to enter. On the other
hand, in states which allow fourth quarter children to enter early, about 25% redshirt.
       Table 2: Distribution of Entry Age (1960 census, 1949-1953 cohorts)
10/1 or 9/30 cutoff 1/1 or 12/31 cutoff
Birth Quarter
Born Quarter One 23.97 24.75
4.5 11.4 10.99
5.5 73.44 72.99
6.5 14.38 14.99
7.5 0.78 1.03
Born Quarter Two 23.84 23.04
4.25 7.42 7.45
5.25 75.94 73.02
6.25 15.56 18.3
7.25 1.08 1.23
Born Quarter Three 26.92 26.81
4 7.28 6.76
5 72.97 73.57
6 18.79 18.59
7 0.96 1.08
Born Quarter Four 25.26 25.40
3.75 4.76 7.64
4.75 40.57 67.21
5.75 47.77 23.54
6.75 6.90 1.62
Note: Constrained to enter at the earliest reasonable age if actual entry age was
either too young or too old
4 Data
We use the 1960 US Census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) one percent sample for
school entry age data and the 1980 U.S. PUMS ve percent sample to measure educational
attainment. Both samples have information on quarter of birth.
The main endogenous variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual
delayed school enrollment from the year he turned 5 to the year he turned 6 or later. Age
in quarters was computed as of Census day (April 1, 1960) using information on quarter
of birth. The census, however, does not collect school entry age information. School entry
age can still be computed using highest grade completed if we assume that no one repeats
or skips a grade. We do not know whether children attended kindergarten or entered rst
grade directly as was common during this period. We treat all individuals as having spent a
year in kindergarten. Thus someone who rst enrolled in school as a rst-grader at exactly
the age of 6 would be counted as having entered school at exactly age 5. Based on this
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assumption, we computed the school starting date for individuals born in the US between
1949 and 1953.
Our identication strategy requires knowledge of exact kindergarten entry cuto¤ dates
for 1954 to 1958, the years in which the individuals in our sample were eligible to enroll
in kindergarten. We collected data on state laws regarding kindergarten entry ages. We
veried these laws by looking at the US historical state statutes. If the history of the statute
indicated a change in the state law in any given year, we examined the state session law to
determine the exact form of the change. Children who entered school in states that gave
Local Education Authorities the power to set the entry age were deleted from the sample.
Table 3 lists the kindergarten entry age cuto¤ dates for 1958 for the states used in our
analysis.
For both samples, we use information on quarter of birth, age, state and cuto¤ date
to determine whether each sample member was born before or after the state cuto¤. We
delete observations for whom we cannot determine whether the individual was born before
or after the cuto¤. For example, we drop individuals born in the third quarter in states with
a September 1 cuto¤. In both data sets, we restrict the sample to individuals whose state
of birth and current residence were identical. The sample is restricted to blacks and whites
including those of Hispanic origin. For the 1980 sample, we only include individuals who
had completed at least one year of schooling. Our nal sample includes 96676 observations
in the 1960 Census and 373845 observations in the 1980 Census. All regressions include
dummies for quarter of birth, sex, race and state and age in quarters and age squared.
                                                              Table 3: School Entry Cutoff Dates in 1958
1-Sep 10-Sept/15-Sept 30-Sept/1-Oct 15-Oct/16-Oct 31-Oct/1-Nov 1-Dec 31-Dec/1-Jan 1-Feb
Colorado Iowa Alabama Idaho DC California Connecticut Pennsylvania
Delaware  Montana Arkansas Maine North Dakota Illinois Florida
Kansas New Hampshire Missouri Nebraska Oklahama Louisiana Kentucky
Michigan Ohio New Jersey South Dakota New York Maryland
Minnesota Wyoming North Carolina West Virginia Wisconsin Mississippi
Oregon Virginia Nevada
Texas New Mexico
Utah Rhode Island
Tennessee
5 Results
5.1 First Stage
Table 4 presents the rst stage results from the 1960 Census for di¤erent choices of instru-
ment. Column (1) reports results from the regression of entry age (in years) on one quarter
of birth dummy (QOB 1 versus all others). Column (2) uses three quarter of birth dummies
(QOB 4 is the omitted quarter). Column (3) shows rst stage results using legal entry age
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as the instrument without quarter of birth controls and nally, column (4) reports estimates
from our basic model, controlling for three birth quarters and a binary instrument (delayed
by law).14 Controlling for legally mandated delayed enrollment in column (4), the school
entry age monotonically decreases with quarter of birth. Column (4) reveals that individ-
uals born in the rst quarter begin school when they are about one-half year older than
are those born in the fourth quarter and who are not constrained by state laws. On the
other hand, in column (2) the quarter of birth instrument shows a much smaller di¤erence
in entry age between the rst and the fourth quarter since it fails to control for the more
restrictive laws in some states. Note also that the e¤ect of delayed is only .37. While
some children born in the fourth quarter begin school when they are rst allowed to enroll,
others are held back an additional year until they are almost 6 years old, and some who are
not legally entitled to enroll before age ve are nevertheless able to do so.
(1) (2) (3) (4) Born in 1953*
Born quarter 1 0.2447 0.2685 0.5585 0.4273
(0.0193) (0.0374) (0.0132) (0.0179)
Born quarter 2 0.1119 0.4024 0.5988
(0.0377) (0.0128) (0.0161)
Born quarter 3 -0.0834 0.1942 0.4468
(0.0392) (0.0118) (0.0161)
Delayed by Law 0.3664 0.1985
(0.0397) (0.0161)
Legal entry age 0.4141
(0.0551)
Observations 96676 96676 96676 96676 19949
R-squared 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.18
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state/quarter of birth.
Controls: state fixed effects, age in quarters, age square, race (white/black) and sex.
Sample restricted to individuals for whom state of birth is identical to birthplace.
                      Dependent Variable: School Entrance Age
Table 4: First Stage Estimates: 1960 census (1949-1953 cohorts)
One concern with the entry age variable is that since we assume there is no grade
retention, we are overestimating the entry age. This is especially problematic since past
14Note that this specication is isomorphic to one in which legal age is used as the IV and quarter of birth
is included in the structural equation. This specication can be found in the literature as a robustness check
(Elder and Lubotsky, 2006).
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research has shown that the probability of repeating a grade is related to school entry age.
Although we do not have information on grade retention in the Census, we can minimize the
error in measuring the entry age variable by restricting the sample to the youngest cohort.
The fth column of Table 4 restricts the sample to those born in 1953. If one assumes that
entry patterns were constant from 1949 to 1953, then the di¤erence between the baseline
estimates in column (4) and those obtained using only the 1953 data reect the e¤ect of
grade retention. In this case, estimates based on 1953 data would be preferred. Estimates
using the 1953 only rst-stage can be obtained by multiplying coe¢ cient on delayed in
the baseline model by :3664=:4273 or :8575.
It is also worth noting that, using the 1953 data, the di¤erence in entry age between those
born in the second and third quarter is almost exactly .25, suggesting that monotonicity
would apply to a sample of individuals born in these quarters. This, in turn, would mean
that it is possible to compute a LATE based on these samples. However, it is not clear that
this LATE would be of any policy interest.
QOB Legal Age Delayed
                                     Dependent Variable: Educational Attainment
Legal entry age/Delayed -0.0290 -0.0029
(0.0211) (0.0265)
Born in quarter 1 -0.0444 -0.0689
(0.0081) (0.0222)
Born in quarter 2 -0.0459
(0.022)
Born in quarter 3 -0.0122
(0.0234)
Observations 373845 373845 373845
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state/quarter of birth.
Additional controls for state, age in quarters, age squared, race (white/black) and sex.
Table 5: Reduced Form Estimates 1980 census (1949-1953 cohorts)
5.2 Reduced-Form and TS2SLS Estimates
Table 5 reports reduced-form estimates from the 1980 Census. In column (1), which gives the
reduced form when the instrument is born in rst quarter, the instrument is associated
with a large negative e¤ect on educational attainment. In column (2), legal entry age
instrument shows a somewhat smaller and statistically insignicant adverse e¤ect. Finally,
the last column indicates that controlling for quarter of birth, there is almost no e¤ect of
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QOB  Legal Age Delayed
                                            Dependent Variable: Educational Attainment
Predicted Entrance Age -0.1815 -0.0700 -0.0078
(0.0422) (0.0450) (0.0727)
Born in quarter 1 -0.0645
(0.0229)
Born in quarter 2 -0.0427
(0.0146)
Born in quarter 3 -0.0107
(0.0152)
Observations 373845 373845 373845
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05
Note: Moulton-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Additional controls for state, age in quarters, age squared, race (white/black) and sex.
Table 6: Two Sample Instrumental Variable Estimates 1960-1980 census
delayed school entry on educational attainment.
Table 6 combines estimates from the 1960 and 1980 Censuses. Using rst stage coe¢ -
cients reported in Table 4, we predict entry age for the 1980 Census respondents. TS2SLS
estimates are generated by a regression of 1980 educational outcomes on the predicted en-
try age. Using the method described in the appendix, we correct the standard errors to
account for the fact that the predicted value of school entry age is used in the second stage.
In addition, the standard errors are adjusted for clustering (at the level of state*quarter of
birth) using a parametric Moulton (1986) correction factor.15
When we use born in the rst quarter as our instrument, consistent with Angrist
and Krueger, we nd a large negative e¤ect of school entry age on educational attainment.
When we use legal entry age (not controlling for quarter of birth), we nd a smaller but still
substantial adverse e¤ect that falls short of statistical signicance at conventional levels and
is therefore consistent with the zero e¤ect in Bedard and Dhuey. Finally, when we use the
consistent estimator that meets the monotonicity requirement, our estimate is very close to
zero.
We also study the e¤ect of delayed enrollment on other measures of educational at-
tainment namely, high school Dropout/completion and college attendance. We have also
15Stata does not have a command to compute the Moulton standard errors. We use the user written
command provided by Joshua Angrist and Steve Pischke.
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Entire Sample Blacks Only
Attainment -0.0078 0.2759
(0.0727) (0.2250)
High School Dropout -0.0136 -0.0832
(0.0107) (0.0425)
Note: Moulton-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7: TS2SLS Estimates: Blacks Only
looked at the di¤erences in outcomes by sex, race and race and sex interacted, but do not
nd any statistically signicant e¤ect. We do not nd any e¤ect for whites or for either sex
separately. However, as shown in Table 7, we nd a nontrivial and marginal statistically
signicant e¤ect of delay on the dropout rate among blacks. For blacks delaying entry to
school is associated with a decline in the dropout rate of about 8 percentage points. Our
point estimates also suggest that delayed entry increases educational attainment among
blacks by a nontrivial quarter of a year. However, the coe¢ cient is not signicant at con-
ventional levels. We do not want to put too much weight on this nding. After all, we
have looked for signicant e¤ects on several overlapping groups using multiple measures
of educational attainment. Finding a t-statistic of just under 1.96 in one specication for
one group is not all that unlikely. However, it is plausible that blacks were a¤ected more
adversely by delay than were other groups. For blacks, it is particularly important to note
the historical nature of the nding since we are looking at students starting school during a
period that preceded the 1964 Civil Rights Act and when blacks were hugely disadvantaged
both in terms of school quality and parental income. It is plausible that black children (and
other children from disadvantaged backgrounds) who enter school early did so for nancial
reasons and were frequently pushed ahead before they were su¢ ciently mature.
6 Optimal School Entry Age
The three estimates in Table 6 may di¤er for one or both of two reasons. First, if the
failure of the monotonicity assumption is important, quarter of birth and legal entry age
instruments do not provide a consistent estimate of a local average treatment e¤ect. Second,
the local average treatment e¤ects captured by the instruments may di¤er. To determine
the importance of these two sources of divergence, we propose and estimate a model of
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optimal school entry age. We then use the model to examine the relations between the two
standard IV estimators and the e¤ects they are intended to measure.
6.1 Model
Every child has an optimal school entry age, Ei , where
Ei = a0 + a1 eEi
We assume that the random component, eEi is distributed Beta(; ) with the two shape
parameters  and . The parameters a0 and a1 determine the bounds of the optimal entry
age distribution, a0 gives the lower bound while a0 + a1 sets the upper bound. We allow
a0 to depend on the state entry age law. However, because we have data on quarter of
birth (as opposed to month of birth), we restrict the analysis to two types of states. The
unconstrained states (u) refers to states with a either a 1/1 cuto¤ or a 12/31 cuto¤. The
second type of state, the fourth quarter constrained state (c); is restricted to states with
9/30 or 10/1 cuto¤.
We introduce a shift parameter for being in a constrained state:
aco = a
u
o + 
This implies that raising the minimum entry age for fourth quarter children may a¤ect
the optimal entry age for everyone else. By allowing the optimal entry age to be a¤ected
by school entry age laws, we are allowing for spillover e¤ect of laws. Existence of such
externalities would be a violation of the exclusion restriction required for identication
using instrumental variables, including our own, based on legal entry age.
Let Ei be the actual age at which a child begins school. Ei would di¤er across children
because of di¤erences in quarter of birth and school cuto¤. We assume that students su¤er
an education penalty if they enter at an age other than their optimal entry age Ei . For
example, a student who is born on March 1 and whose optimal entry age would be age 5
(if school started on March 1), is now forced to enter at age 5.5 because school begins on
September 1. She su¤ers a loss associated with being six months away from her optimal
entry age. We assume that the education loss is quadratic in the absolute departure from
optimal entry age. Thus, ultimate educational attainment is given by:
Si = S

i + 1  jEi   Ei j+ 2  (Ei   Ei )2
Si , which is unobserved, is the educational attainment the individual would have at-
tained if she had entered at exactly her optimal entry age. We assume that Si is independent
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of quarter of birth and state cuto¤ date. This assumption rules out season of birth e¤ects
(Bound and Jaeger, 1995, 2000; Buckles and Hungerman, 2009) and also allows us to focus
attention on the quadratic cost term.
Our choice of this particular form is driven by the paucity of data. As discussed below,
we use the data to identify six parameters. We impose that auo + a1 equals 7: In other
words the highest optimal school entry age in an unconstrained state is seven years old.
We choose this restriction because all states require children to enter school by the time
they are eight years old. Since in most states, kindergarten is not required, eight year olds
starting school would typically enter rst grade. This is equivalent to requiring children to
begin kindergarten at age seven in our model.
6.2 Indirect Inference
We use indirect inference to estimate the six parameters of the model (a0; ; ; ; and 1
and 2), with a1 = 7   a0; so that the moments from the simulation match the moments
from the data. We generate 10,000 draws from the beta distribution.
For simplicity, we assume that children born in quarter 1 are born on 2/15, quarter 2
on 5/15, quarter 3 on 8/15, and quarter 4 on 11/15. Further we assume that the rst day
of school each year is August 15th in every state. This implies that Quarter 1 students can
enter school at age 4.5, 5.5, or 6.5. Similarly, those born in quarter 2 can enter at 4.25, 5.25
or 6.25 and so on for the third and the fourth quarter.
We do not impose that individuals enter school at the date that is closest to their optimal
entry age. Instead we assume that individuals with the lowest optimal starting age are the
ones among those born in a given quarter who enter when youngest. In other words, if we
observe in the data that 10% of rst quarter children enter at age 4.5, we assume that these
are the 10% of the rst quarter children with the lowest optimal entry age.
Based on these assumptions, we use the distribution of entry age (1949-1953 cohorts)
from the 1960 Census to generate simulated data. Thus, we allocate individuals to their
entry age in the simulated data consistent with their quarter of birth and whether they live
in a 4th quarter constrained state or not. Table 3 shows that there are 15 states in the
sample with cuto¤ dates corresponding to the c and u states. The Census distribution of
entry age that we use to generate the simulated data has been shown earlier in Table 2. As
previously noted, Table 2 does not suggest a spillover e¤ect of increasing entry age for those
born in the fourth quarter on those born in the rst three quarters. We have also noted
that in the 1950s the laws were not strictly enforced as there is a lot of noncompliance in
this sample.
Next, we regress educational attainment from the 1980 census on three quarter of birth
dummies, age in quarters and its square and state dummies, separately for the two types
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Estimated Simulated Estimated Simulated
I II III I II III
Quarter 1 -0.076 -0.076 -0.079 -0.078 -0.093 -0.093 -0.095 -0.096
(0.013) (0.010)
Quarter 2 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.046 -0.046 -0.038 -0.038
(0.016) (0.014)
Quarter 3 0.023 0.023 0.018 0.017 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.012) (0.007)
Note: Robust SE clustered by state/quarter of birth. Controls include state dummies, age in quarters and its square.
N=292771
Table 8: Educational Attainment and Quarter of Birth by State Type
Unconstrained States Constrained States
of states to get the vector of coe¢ cients bdata(i.e. a total of six moments, coe¢ cients on
three quarter of birth dummies in each type of state). These coe¢ cients are the di¤erence in
average education between those born in each of the rst three quarters and those born in
the fourth quarter in each type of state. Identication in this model depends only on within
state-type education di¤erences since we are not using the di¤erence in average educational
attainment between the two types of states.
Finally, we characterize the loss function as the sum of the squared deviations between
the regression coe¢ cients from the simulated data and the actual regression coe¢ cients
weighted by the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates, b.
More formally, the objective of our indirect inference simulations is to choose parameters
of optimal entry age distribution (; ; a0; plus the shift parameter for constrained states,
) and of the education loss function (1 and 2) to minimize the following loss function:
(bdata   bsim)0b 1(bdata   bsim)
6.3 Simulation Results
Table 8 shows results from regressions of educational attainment on three quarter of birth
dummies using the actual and simulated data. It shows the average di¤erence in educa-
tional attainment between the fourth quarter and the three other quarters. Consistent with
Angrist and Krueger (1991), in both types of states individuals born in the rst quarter get
less education than do those born in the other quarters.
Table 8 also shows the estimates based on simulated data from the three variants of
the model. Model I is the unconstrained model previously described. It ts the actual
data almost exactly.16 Model II constrains the quadratic term 2 to be zero, while model
16Although the literature on indirect inference assumes that if the number of model parameters equals the
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III constrains both 2 and , the shift parameter between constrained and unconstrained
states both to be zero. It is evident that neither of these restrictions prevents the model
from tting the empirical parameters quite precisely. We address this point more formally
in the next table.
The top panel of table 9 shows the tted parameters. The rst column gives the pa-
rameters for the base model. For the most part, the estimated parameters are plausible.
The lowest optimal entry age is just under four years old; the mean is about 5.3, and the
distribution is somewhat skewed so that the median is lower. There is little evidence of
an external e¤ect from raising the minimum school entry age. The distribution of optimal
entry ages is less than .01 higher in states with an October 1 cuto¤ than in states with a
cuto¤ at the end of the year. The main problem with the model in the rst column is that
the cost parameters are implausible. The estimates imply that individuals benet from de-
viating from their optimal entry age until the deviation exceeds six months and that those
who deviate by a year do almost as well as those who enter at exactly their optimal age.
                                                                                  Table 9: Model Parameter Estimates and Implied Treatment Effects
Baseline No Quadratic Term No Quadratic, No λ
Model Estimates
Beta Distribution
α 1.64 0.83 0.81
β 2.21 2.29 2.25
Bounds of optimal age
a0 3.97 4.49 4.5
a1 3.03 2.51 2.5
Loss from Deviating
μ1 6.89 -0.67 -0.67
μ2 -6.92 0* 0*
External Effect
λ 0.01 0.01 0*
Loss Function 0.00 0.78 0.81
*Coefficients constrained
a0 and a1 are constrained to sum to 7
We therefore restrict the quadratic term to be zero. The results are shown in the second
column. We note rst that the restriction cannot be rejected. The loss function only
increases to .78, well below the critical value for a chi-squared with one degree of freedom.17
The lowest optimal entry age is now estimated to be four and a half, suggesting that some
number of empirical parameters, the t must be perfect, it is easy to show that this need not be the case
even when the underlying model is correctly specied.
17We also experimented with restricting the linear term to be zero, on the grounds that the derivative of
education with respect to entry age should be smooth around the optimal entry age. While we cannot reject
this model at conventional levels of signicance, the loss function with this specication is substantially
higher than with the restriction on the quadratic term.
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children born in the rst quarter should enter in the year they turn four, something that
was relatively unusual even in the 1950s. The parameters of the beta-distribution imply
that optimal entry age is very skewed. The mean is 6:3 but the median is only 5:0. Most
children would benet from entering when relatively young, but some would be better o¤
being signicantly older than the norm.
We continue to nd no evidence that constraining the age at which children born in the
fourth quarter can enter school has any e¤ect on the optimal age for other children. The
estimated value of  is less than .01. Therefore in the third column of Table 9, we restrict
the value of  to be zero.
Given the very low value of ; it is not surprising that this restriction cannot be rejected.
The loss function increases by only .03, and the remaining results do not change noticeably.
If we accept the two parameters restrictions imposed in the third column, then, in
principle, it is possible to unconstrain a1 which determines the oldest age at which it is
optimal for any child to entry school. It will be apparent that since the loss function is only
.81, we will not be able to reject that the a0+a1 equals 7. In practice, a1 is very imprecisely
estimated, and we have been unable to converge the model without this restriction.
Both the second and third columns of Table 9 imply that the cost of entering at the
wrong age is large. A child who enters at exactly age 5 and who should have entered at
exactly age 6 or vice versa loses, on average, about two-thirds of a year of education. Of
course, almost everyone can choose to enter within six months of her optimal entry age.
The major exceptions are individuals with very young optimal entry ages who are born in
the rst quarter or who are born in the fourth quarter in states requiring them to wait until
the year in which they turn six to enter school.
6.4 Reconsidering the Instruments
As discussed earlier, there are at least two reasons that the IV estimates using (rst) quarter
of birth, legal age, and delayed by law may diverge. The rst is that the failure of the
monotonicity assumption makes either one or both of the rst two estimators inconsistent.
The second is that they measure di¤erent local average treatment e¤ects.
Table 10 shows the results of applying each of the IV estimators to the data generated
by our model. We calculated the estimates for the models in columns 2 and 3 of Table 9.
Since they gave identical results to two decimal places, we do not distinguish between them
here.
The rst column of Table 10 repeats the results from Table 6. The corresponding rows
in the second column show the estimates applied to our data. Although our parameters
were not chosen to match the three IV estimates, the model ts the broad pattern found in
the data. The born in rst quarterinstrument shows the most adverse e¤ect of delaying
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entry while the delayed by law instrument nds the least adverse and possibly positive
e¤ect. In each case, the estimate derived from the model lies within the condence interval
of the actual estimate.
                                                         Table 10: Effects of Entry Age on Education
From Data From Model
IV - Quarter 1 -0.18 -0.23
(0.04)
True LATE - Quarter 1 -0.26
IV - Legal Age -0.07 -0.09
(0.05)
True LATE - Legal Age -0.22
True LATE - Delayed -0.01 0.06
(0.07)
Next we ask how well each IV estimator would capture its intended LATE if the true
world were generated by our model. What LATE should each estimator capture? In the
absence of monotonicity the concept is not well-dened. For the quarter-of-birth instrument,
our solution is to treat all induced entry age changes as positive. Thus, we dene LATE as
the local average treatment e¤ect of taking someone born in the rst quarter and having
him be born in each of the other three quarters (in each of the two types of states) but
accounting for the sign of the e¤ect on entry age. To do this, we rank every observation
in increasing order of the optimal entry age in each of the four quarters. We match the
corresponding lowest optimal entry age in the rst quarter with the lowest in the second,
third and fourth quarters. Similarly, the second lowest in the rst quarter is matched with
second lowest in each of the other quarters and so on. Thus, we match up individuals in the
rst quarter with individuals with the same ranking in the optimal entry age distribution in
the other three quarters. Next, we calculate the di¤erence in entry age and the di¤erence in
education for each of the observations to get a total of three di¤erences for each observation
in each type of state and six di¤erences overall. Since we want to satisfy monotonicity,
if the di¤erence in entry age is negative, we ip the sign of the entry age and education
attainment di¤erences. Using these numbers, we calculate the true LATE as the total loss
in education divided by the di¤erence in average entry age.
The true LATE dened in this way is given in the second row of the last column of
Table 10. At least in the world represented by our model, the IV estimator is somewhat
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biased but not badly so. It is o¤ by about .03.
Although the legal entry LATE relies on variation in both birth date and state laws, it
seems to us that the goal is to estimate the e¤ect of a small increase in entry age (from
being born on, for example, February 1 rather than February 2) rather than some strange
combination of small increases due to birth dates and large increases due to state law. We
therefore calculate the (numeric) derivative of educational attainment with respect to an
increase in entry age for all individuals in our sample and take the average. The result of
this exercise is shown in the fourth line of the last column in Table 10. It is evident that if
this is the LATE that legal ageis intended to capture, then it badly fails to do so. The
estimated LATE is quite far from the true LATE.
By construction, using our approach, we get a consistent LATE estimate of the e¤ect
of the policy change of moving from a December 31 to an earlier cuto¤ on the educational
attainment of children born in the fourth quarter (i.e. those children whose behavior is
a¤ected by the law). However, it is important to recognize that our estimates assume
that there are no externalities from this change. We nd no evidence of the existence of
such externalities, but this is quite di¤erent from nding strong evidence of their absence.
Conditional on this caveat, those children whose entry is delayed, on average, are not harmed
and may benet slightly from the delay.
6.5 Policy Experiments
An important policy question that arises from our analysis is whether our results would hold
in the current school system where school entry laws are relatively strictly enforced. The
weakly enforced cuto¤ dates in the 1950s may not be applicable to the debates involving
school entry age today. Schools today are under great pressure to adhere to strict standards.
As discussed in the introduction, a variety of factors have pushed states and districts to
increase entry age requirements and enforce them more strictly, but it is very uncertain as
to whether such policies are benecial.
To study the e¤ect of delaying school entry on attainment in recent years, we use the
simulated data to perform some policy experiments. First, we look at the e¤ect of moving
from a January 1 cuto¤ to an October 1 cuto¤ around the 1950s, a period when such cuto¤s
were very loosely enforced. Second, we consider what would have happened had their been
a strict October 1 cuto¤.
Table 11 reports the results from these two experiments. In the rst column, we explore
the e¤ect of the policy in a model that permits the policy to a¤ect the optimal entry age.
In this experiment we assume that the small di¤erences we observe between the entry age
decisions of parents of children born in the rst three quarters and living in constrained
states and those of their counterparts in unconstrained states reect responses to the change
24
                                                                                                        Table 11: Effect of Raising Entry Age by Type of Law Enforcement: Assorted Models
No Quadratic Term No Quadratic, No Externality*
Weak Enforcement
Change in Educational Attainment
All 0.008
Q1 0.006
Q2 0.003
Q3 0.004
Q4 0.022 0.022
All 61.8
Q1 79.2
Q2 70.5
Q3 50.1
Q4 47.6 56.3
Strong Enforcement
Change in Educational Attainment
All -0.060
Q1 0.005
Q2 0.003
Q3 0.000
Q4 -0.246 -0.250
All 54.6
Q1 77.9
Q2 70.4
Q3 50.0
Q4 20.4 18.4
*With no externality, there is no effect on other quarters or on those who do not change their behavior.
**Of those changing their educational levels
Percent Increasing Educational Attainment* *
Percent Increasing Educational Attainment* *
in optimal entry age. When we use the model that assumes no externalities, we assume
such entry age changes are random and ignore them.
The top panel shows the e¤ect of weak enforcement. In both models there is a slight
increase in average education, with the benets accruing primarily among children born in
the fourth quarter. Strikingly, even though the average child born in the fourth quarter
benets, in each model roughly half of those whom the law causes to delay entry benet
and half do not. When we allow the policy to increase the optimal entry age for everyone,
most children born in the other quarters benet, but the average gains are very small.
The lower panel shows the results from the policy experiment with strict enforcement.
In the rst column, we assume that the increase in optimal entry age is proportional to the
increase in average entry age, so there is a bigger externality when enforcement is strict.
Both with and without an e¤ect on optimal entry age, we nd that moving from a January
1 cuto¤ lowers average educational attainment by about .06 years, with a large adverse
e¤ect on those born in the fourth quarter and positive e¤ects on those born in the rst two
quarters in the scenario allowing for externalities.
When laws were weakly enforced, the constrained children (those born in the fourth
quarter) had the option to enter school earlier than o¢ cially permissible. We see ample
evidence of this happening in our data. In this environment, overall, children beneted,
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in terms of higher educational attainment, by moving to an October 1st cuto¤. However,
the policy experiment suggests that, in an environment where laws are strictly enforced,
constraining fourth quarter children to enter late hurts these children and reduces average
educational attainment.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that previous studies that have used IV to deal with the endogeneity
of school entry age have focused on a LATE of no real policy or practical interest. Moreover,
they have failed to provide consistent estimates of the LATE because of the failure of the
monotonicity assumption. As a practical matter, this turns out to be a bigger problem for
the legal ageinstrument than for the rst-quarter birthinstrument.
Our two sample results suggest that the quarter of birth instrument yields severely biased
estimates of the policy-relevant LATE. The born in rst quarter instrument, consistent
with Angrist and Krueger, gives a large negative e¤ect of school entry age on educational
attainment. When we use legal entry age (not controlling for quarter of birth), we nd
a smaller adverse e¤ect but one that falls short of statistical signicance at conventional
levels (consistent with the zero e¤ect in Bedard and Dhuey). We propose an instrument that
satises the monotonicity assumption and gives a consistent estimates of the policy-relevant
LATE: the e¤ect of requiring a child to enter school in the year she turns six when she would
otherwise have entered a year earlier. The results are consistent with no important policy
e¤ect as the policy was practiced in the 1950s.
However, over the last fty years, school entry age laws have become noticeably stricter
both in requiring children to be older before entering school and through stricter enforcement
of the laws limiting entry although they generally continue to permit redshirting. We
nd that stricter enforcement of the laws in the 1950s would have had adverse e¤ects on
educational attainment. While we do not know whether the results continue to apply today,
they do provide evidence of considerable variation in optimal entry age and therefore suggest
that having a waiver policy that gives constrained children the choice to enter earlier than
the legally established age could increase educational attainment, particularly among groups
that have high dropout rates.
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Appendix: Standard Error Derivation
Let the rst stage be
Yic = XicB1 + cDic + c + "ic (A1)
where observations are indexed by i and grouped in clusters indexed by c. D is the excluded
instrument. Within each cluster c, the (Yi; Xi)0s are correlated, but (Yi; Xi) from di¤erent
clusters are independent. Let c be the random component specic to cluster c and "ic is
the individual specic error term.
For convenience we can write the rst stage as
Yic = Zic  + c + "ic
Let the structural equation be
yic = XicB2 + Yic + c + ic (A2)
= XicB2 + (Zic  + c + "ic) + c + ic
= XicB2 + Zic  + c + ic
= XicB2 + Zicb  + c + ic + (Zic(   b )
Let X = [X Zb ] and B = [B2 ]:
Then
V ( bB) = E(X0X) 1X0$$0X(X0X) 1
where $ is the error term dened above i.e.
$ = c + ic +
h
Zic(   b )i
Each of the error terms is orthogonal to Z. Therefore the TS2SLS covariance matrix in the
presence of clustering is given by:
V ( bBTS2SLS;Moulton) = (X0X) 1X0
X(X0X) 1+2(XX) 1X0ZV (b )Z 0X(X0X) 1
(A3)
where 
 is a block diagonal matrix with diagonal elements !c (the intra-cluster correlation
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matrix for each cluster c)
! =
26666664
2 + 
2
 
2
 : : 
2

2 
2
 + 
2

: :
: :
2 
2
 + 
2

37777775 (A4)
and
V (b ) = (Z 0Z) 1Z 0
2Z(Z 0Z) 1: (A5)
It is easy to show that this formula reduces to the asymptotic covariance matrix formula
for TS2SLS estimator derived by Inoue and Solon (2008). However, we also correct for the
possibility of Moulton clustering in each stage.
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